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Abstract
Most centralities proposed for identifying influential spreaders on social networks to
either spread a message or to stop an epidemic require the full topological information
of the network on which spreading occurs. In practice, however, collecting all
connections between agents in social networks can be hardly achieved. As a result, such
metrics could be difficult to apply to real social networks. Consequently, a new
approach for identifying influential people without the explicit network information is
demanded in order to provide an efficient immunization or spreading strategy, in a
practical sense. In this study, we seek a possible way for finding influential spreaders by
using the social mechanisms of how social connections are formed in real networks. We
find that a reliable immunization scheme can be achieved by asking people how they
interact with each other. From these surveys we find that the probabilistic tendency to
connect to a hub has the strongest predictive power for influential spreaders among
tested social mechanisms. Our observation also suggests that people who connect
different communities is more likely to be an influential spreader when a network has a
strong modular structure. Our finding implies that not only the effect of network
location but also the behavior of individuals is important to design optimal
immunization or spreading schemes.
Author Summary
Introduction
Identifying influential spreaders on social networks is crucial for its practical application
in real-world epidemic and information spreading [1–5]. For instance, superspreaders
need to be immunized with the highest priority in order to prevent the pandemic of an
infectious disease [6–10]. They are also important for spreading of information in viral
marketing [4, 5, 11, 12]. To this end, several predictors for influential spreaders based on
the topological property of complex networks, including high degree [6, 13]
k-core [8, 14, 15], betweenness centrality [16], PageRank [17], and many others [18] were
tested for identifying influential spreaders [8–10].
Most studies, however, have overlooked how to apply to the real-world social systems
which is a serious problem in a practical sense. Most proposed centralities except the
degree, which is a local centrality, require the information of the whole network
structure. But collecting this information is nearly impracticable in real social systems.
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Specifically, gathering information of relationships among individuals is inevitably
incomplete and erroneous [19], since it cannot but be conducted for a partial sample of
a whole population. Thus, searching for the influential spreaders with these centralities
may not be plausible for real-world spreading phenomena. On the other hand, if whole
connections in a network are accessible, direct measuring for the influence of a single
node is possible by using model simulation on the network, which obviates the need for
predicting influential spreaders. Consequently, in reality most predictors proposed for
an influential spreader are either inapplicable or unnecessary.
Thus more realistic approaches based on the characteristics of people such as their
behaviors are demanded for predicting influential people without the explicit
information of network structure. The benefit of this method is an easy applicability for
any kinds of social networks since one can obtain the probabilistic actions of agents by
using a survey conducted from a population. Through a survey, we can estimate the
probabilistic tendency of how connections are established for each individual, for
instance, how probable is to make a new friend by introduction from another friend or
the frequency to make new friends from different groups. We find that these human
actions have a large influence on the subsequent spreading of information and therefore
can be a reliable predictor of the node’s importance in a future epidemic or in a viral
marketing campaign via targeting people identified by their probabilistic actions. In
addition, such ranking obtained from surveys can also apply to the situations when the
information for only some people is accessible.
The social mechanisms of link formation driving evolution of networks have been
studied for a long time in order to explain and predict complex phenomena in society. A
number of social mechanisms for connection establishments have been proposed in
sociology [20,21]. Thanks to the detailed records in online social networks that captures
the action of every individual, it is now possible to quantify the frequency of occurrence
of different types of mechanisms by directly observing social interactions [22]. Thus,
recently, the frequencies of the social mechanisms for each person in a social network
have been revealed from the full log of the activity in online social networks [22].
In this paper, we propose an approach to identify influential spreaders based on
surveys on human behavior and social mechanisms that can be given to a population
without the explicit information of networks. We decode the relation between people’s
characteristics that can be obtained by a survey and their influence in spreading using
the real-world datasets that contain the full information of network evolution. Through
the analysis of large-scale evolving networks, we identify the effect of the microscopic
link formation on macroscopic consequences in spreading. We find that the interaction
to connecting a hub can facilitate epidemic spreading and thus can be a reliable
predictor of people’s importance in future epidemics or viral marketing campaigns. We
also find that people with high frequency to connect different communities are more
likely to be an influential spreader for the case when a network is composed of strongly
connected modules. This research represents much to practical implication, since our
finding can be adopted in reality requiring only the tendency of individuals’ behaviors.
Furthermore, our results provide a guideline for behavior to the public, about how to
behave at the beginning stage of epidemic.
Materials and Methods
Social mechanism
In this paper, the social mechanisms are referred to as the probabilistic tendency of each
kind of interaction among people in a given social network. The social mechanisms do
not directly mean the motivation behind the link creation because several different
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mechanisms may result in the same type of link formation and link formation may not
be motivated by only the structure [22]. In addition, these mechanisms are not
complementary one another, because a link can be established by multiple different
mechanisms. For instance, a newly created link can appear following balance and
exchange interactions at the same time.
We use four classes of social mechanisms underlying the link creation on a network
based on the multitheoretical multilevel formalism [20] proposed in sociology: (1)
Exchange interaction corresponds to a newly form reciprocal link meaning that a new
link is established in the opposite direction of an existing link. (2) Balance interaction
corresponds to a newly form tie that closes a triangle by a directed edge. (3) Collective
action (or preferential attachment [23]) corresponds to a link that connects with
well-connected people. To be specific, in this study, we measure the extent of the
collective action of each link as a continuous value using the cumulative probability
F (ki) of the excess degree distribution for a newly connected neighbor i. Here,
F (k) =
∑
kj<k
kjq(kj)/〈k〉 where q(k) is the degree distribution of a network and 〈k〉
represents the average degree of a network. (4) Structural hole interaction considers a
newly created link that connects two different modules (communities). Community
structure is identified by the local version of link community detection method [1] when
a new link is established [see detailed in Text S2].
These social mechanisms are assigned on an evolving network at the moment when
the link is newly added following the analysis developed in [22]. While constructing the
evolving network by adding the new connection in sequential order, we characterize each
connection to the corresponding social mechanisms based on a network configuration at
the given moment. After all links are formed, the frequencies of social mechanisms of
the origin node, i, aexci , a
bal
i , a
ca
i , and a
sh
i , where i is node index, are defined as the
number of neighbors that were connected by the corresponding mechanism, respectively,
exchange, balance, collective action, and structural hole (the sum of the extent for the
collective action of all connected nodes) normalized by the total number of neighbors.
To be specific, the frequency aαi of social mechanism α for node i is defined as
aαi =
nαi
kouti
, where nαi is the number of links formed corresponding to α social mechanism
and kouti is the outdegree (the total number of new connections). Therefore, each
variable ranges from zero to unity, and as ai increases, the corresponding social
interaction is more frequent.
We stress here that the extent of social mechanisms of link creation for each
individual can be estimated in a real setting by the surveys given to the population. For
instance, one first could ask people to list their contacts and then as a second stage ask
questions about each contact [25]. For example, we could ask questions like, (exchange)
did the person contact you first?, (balance) did the person have common friends with
you when you contacted him/her?, (collective action) did the person have a lot of
contacts when you contacted him/her?, (structural hole) did person belong to another
group than you when you contacted him/her? Therefore, an estimate of ai for each
individual can be obtained from the surveys conducted for the population. On the
contrary, most centralities including k-shell index [8], betweenness centrality [16], and
PageRank [17] cannot be obtained by this way since they require global network
information.
Data sets
We examine two social networks of Internet dating services in Sweden [22,26] and the
forum of internet-mediated prostitution in Brazil [27]. These social networks represent
potential pathways for epidemic spreading including sexually transmitted diseases. We
use the data of the largest site qx.se for Nordic homosexual, bisexual, and transgender
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Table 1. Properties of real-world networks used in this study.
Network Name Number of nodes 〈k〉 Modularity [28]
QX.com favorite QXF 80,407 13.07 0.4060
QX.com guestbook QXG 59,854 7.10 0.3893
POK.com POK 29,242 5.95 0.3992
Livejournal.com LJ 315,936 3.56 0.6578
Prostitution PRO 16,729 4.67 0.6294
〈k〉 is the average degree of the network. We use the fast-greedy community detection
algorithm [28] for measuring modularity.
people in 2006 (QX). Actions of every individual in the community, including adding an
individual to the favorite list and guestbook signing, were recorded for two months
starting from Nov. 2005. We use adding favorite lists (QXF) and signing guestbook lists
(QXG) among many activities. We also analyze pussokram pussokram.com dataset
(POK) [26], which was a Swedish online dating site for friendship including flirting and
non-romantic relations. The data contains a full log for 512 days starting from the day
when the community was created in 2011. The POK network that we use in this study
consists of message senders, receiver, and the timing of interactions in the community.
Internet-mediated prostitution data (PRO) [27] comes from Brazilian online forum
where sex-buyers evaluate prostitutes. We construct the PRO network by connecting
sex-sellers with buyers. Since the PRO network is an undirected and bipartite graph,
the exchange and balance interactions are not defined. In order to investigate the
problem of identifying influential spreaders of information, we study the citation
network in the posts of an online network service, livejournal.com (LJ), for information
spreading on social networks [10]. One should note that the QX has already a large part
of network (85 and 87 % for the QXF and QXG, respectively) whereas the others starts
at time t = 0. Table 1 gives the basic information of the datasets.
We can reconstruct the evolving connection of networks, following the precise timing
when a tie has been established, in contrast to the observation of static snapshots of
networks. In our datasets, we can observe every evolution of social networks with the
time stamp of link creations. We stress here that the precise information of temporal
evolution is essential to identify the social mechanisms for each link. The social
mechanisms should be defined at the moment when a new link established [22].
Accumulated static networks do not keep the order of time that links established and
thus are misleading about the social interactions. In this regard, our datasets containing
the full log of network evolution allow us to define social mechanisms properly.
Influential spreader
In order to assess the influence of people for epidemic spreading, we use the epidemic
size Mi originating from a seed i in the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model on
the finally accumulated network [8]. The SIR model has been used to describe infectious
disease for a long time [29]. At the same time, the SIR model is a plausible model of
information spreading [8]. In the SIR model, each node can be in one of three states,
susceptible, infected, or recovered (or removed). Initially, all nodes are in the
susceptible state except for a single node in the infected state. At each time, the
infected node spread a disease/information to a susceptible neighbor with infection
probability β. At the steady state, we measure Mi as the fraction of finally infected
nodes. We define a node with high Mi as highly influential.
We choose the infection probability β to be a value covering a small part of a
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Figure 1. The difference ∆R2(x) of the coefficient of determination when a
variable x is excluded in regression analysis of (a) Eq. (1) and (b) Eq. (2)
in QXF network. (a) k-shell index shows the largest drop of R2, showing the
strongest predictive power for influential spreaders. However, k-shell index is difficult to
obtain since it requires the full topological information of the network. Although the
degree and social mechanisms aα show smaller predictive power than k-shell index, they
can be easily obtained from surveys and have much implication in a real setting. (b)
The degree shows the largest difference among the degree and social mechanisms that
can be obtained from surveys. Next, among the social mechanisms, collective action
shows the largest drop of R2. Thus, collective action is a more reliable predictor than
the others from the human behavioral point of view.
network, β & βc where βc is the epidemic threshold for percolation [3, 29]. When
β  βc, all seed produces similar epidemic size because spreading can cover almost all
network regardless of where it originated from [31].
Results
Predictor for influential spreaders based on human activity.
We recreate the entire network by adding all links in the order of time that they were
established. In order to assess systematically the relation of the epidemic influence Mi
with the social mechanisms as well as topological metrics, we use multilinear regression
analysis [32] with the following model (Tables S1-S5):
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + c5ki + c6k
sh
i + c7k
2sum
i + c8k
sum
i + . (1)
Here, ki is the degree of node i, k
sh
i is the k-shell index [8] (Text S1). k
sum
i is the sum of
degree of the nearest neighbors ksumi =
∑
j∈V (i) kj where V (i) is the set of node i’s
neighbors [10], k2sumi is the sum of degrees of the next-nearest neighbors,
k2sumi =
∑
j∈V2(i) kj where V2(i) is the set of neighbors of node i’s neighbors [10], and 
is the error term. We introduce the topological metrics, since we are interested in how
much information we captured using the social mechanisms tendencies
{aexci , abali , acai , ashi } in comparison with the more common topological measurements,
{ki, kshi , ksumi , k2sumi }. In order to avoid biased observation due to the large fluctuation
in the small degree region, we exclude the data of people with degree less than three
from our analysis.
The k-shell index and its local proxy ksum and k2sum have been regarded as an
efficient topological predictor for influential spreaders [8, 10]. In agreement with these
previous studies, we find that ksh can capture most of the fluctuation in the epidemic
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size for the datasets. To quantify the effect of each variable, we measure the difference
∆R2(x) of the coefficient of determination when a variable x is excluded. In Fig. 1, the
difference ∆R2(kks) of the coefficient of determination is the largest when kks is
excluded from Eq. (1), which confirms the importance of kks. In addition, more than
82.3 % of the fluctuations can be explained by solely the k-shell index for the QXF
network (Table S1). For the QXG, POK, LJ, POK networks, we also find the similar
trend as the QXF (Tables S2-S5). However, being a global quantity, the k-shell index
can be difficult to obtain as discussed above. Therefore, ksh has the limitation to apply
for real social systems despite its strong correlation with the spreading influence. ksum
or k2sum also captures a huge part of the variance in the data. While these are a local
measurement, they still can be difficult to obtain because they require the exact number
of friends of friends at the time when epidemic occurs [10].
The degree k is not behavioral but in contrary to ksh, k2sum, and ksum, the degree k
can be estimated by a survey to individuals by a simple question: how many friends do
you have? Therefore, even if we cannot conceive the structure of network, for many
cases, we can access the information of the degree together with the other social
mechanisms, aαi . Next we are interested in the case where the topological location such
as k-shell cannot be obtained for the reasons explained above. Therefore, we regress the
data of Mi with the variables which can be easily obtained by surveys using the
following model, where ksh, ksum, and k2sum are excluded:
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + c5ki + . (2)
When we consider Eq. (2), we can explain 63 % of the variance for the QXF network
(Table S6), demonstrating that with only surveys we can capture extremely high
amount of the variance. The all variables in Eq. (2) can be easily obtained from surveys,
suggesting that we can rely on surveys for optimally immunization or viral marketing.
Using Eq. (2), we find that the degree is the most reliable predictor for the
influential spreaders among the degree and aαi . When the degree is excluded from
Eq. (2), the coefficient of determination R2 drops 0.49 from 0.62, showing the largest
difference (Fig. 1b). Since the degree represents the number of the transmission
channels for a seed, the degree can play an important role in epidemic spreading on
networks especially at the beginning stage of outbreak [8, 33]. When compared with the
topological location of the people given by k-shell, we find that the degree alone can
explain 58 % of the variance, which compared to the value of k-shell (R2 = 0.82),
indicating that the degree is a worse predictor than k-shell in agreement with [8]. In a
real setting, however, the local degree can have more implication than k-shell because it
can be easily obtained from surveys.
Next, we are interested in what social mechanisms aαi are more important for
spreading besides the local degree. This is not only important for optimal immunization
and information spreading but also for education of the population to avoid certain
behaviors that could spread diseases to huge population. In order to examine the effect
of the social mechanisms clearly, we study the deviation of the epidemic size ∆Mi from
the average epidemic size for people with the same degree by following
∆Mi = Mi −
∑
j δki,kjMj∑
j δki,kj
, (3)
where δi,j represents the Kronecker delta such that the function is 1 if the variables are
equal and 0 otherwise. ∆Mi quantifies the impact of the social mechanisms after
removing the effect induced by the degree, thus, more clearly identify the important
social mechanism for spreading for people with the same degree.
To compare the influence of each social mechanisms in the spreading process, we
study the average size ∆M infected in an epidemic originating at people i with a given
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Figure 2. Collective action predicts influential spreaders more reliably than
other social mechanisms. When spreading originates in people with (aα, aca), the
relative epidemic size M(aα, aca) for the QXF with (a) aexc, (b) abal, and (c) ash, (d-f)
QXG, (g-i) POK, and (j-l) LJ networks. Collective action aca predicts the epidemic
influence more reliably than the other social interactions when we compare for people
with the same degree.
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Figure 3. The effect of weak ties on spreading for different networks with
diverse modularity. The panel shows the slope of the frequency of structural hole
with respect to epidemic influence Mi in regression analysis as a function of modularity
of a underlying network. For networks with highly modular structure such as LJ and
PRO, the frequency of structural hole is positively correlated with Mi.
(aexci , a
bal
i , a
ca
i , a
sh
i ). The average infected population over all the origins with the same
pair of (aα, aβ) is
∆M =
∑
i∈W (aα,aβ)
∆Mi
N(aα, aβ)
, (4)
where W (aα, aβ) is the union of all nodes with (aα, aβ) and N(aα, aβ) is the number of
nodes with (aα, aβ). In Fig. 2, we find that ∆M increases with increasing aca regardless
with the other social mechanisms for all tested networks. This clear pattern suggests
that aca predicts the epidemic influence more reliably than the other social interactions
when we compare for people with the same degree.
The regression analysis of Eq. (2) also supports the importance of the collective
action. When we remove acai from Eq. (2), the difference ∆R
2 of the coefficient of
determination is the largest, which confirms the importance of collective action. Since
people with high collective action are more likely to have many next nearest neighbors.
they have high chance to develop larger epidemic outbreaks. On the contrary, people
with less collective action, is likely to be located at the periphery of a network leading
to a small impact in the spreading. Thus, the collective action is a reliable predictor
from the human behavioral point of view when we factor out the popularity.
Strength of weak ties and community structure.
So far, we search the most influential spreaders based on social mechanisms, aαi which
can be obtained by surveys. In sociology, a long-standing hypothesis for influential
spreaders is the strength of weak ties [34]. According to the hypothesis, weak ties which
bridge between two densely connected modules formed by strong ties play an important
role especially in the job changing in labor market [34,35], mobile communication
networks [36], as well as brain [37]. While this hypothesis may seem counter-intuitive,
for a perspective of information spreading, the weak ties is more likely to be a source of
fresh information, so weak ties can have a stronger effect than strong ties.
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In this section, we test the weak tie hypothesis by observing the evolution of link
formation in a large scale real-world network. We define weak connection as a link
bridging two different communities at the time when a new link is formed, called
structural hole. If weak ties play an important role in spreading processes as the
hypothesis of weak ties, people with high probability of structural hole interactions is
more likely to have influence in spreading. In order to test the effect of weak ties
(structural hole), we regress the data of Mi with the variables of social mechanisms a
α
i
using the following model, where the network properties ksh, ksum, k2sum, and k are
excluded:
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + . (5)
The degree k is also excluded in order to focus on the effect of behavioral factors on
spreading.
From the regression analysis, we confirm that people with high frequency of
structural hole interaction is more likely to be an influential spreaders on LJ and PRO
networks as the weak tie hypothesis. In LJ and PRO networks, the frequency of
structural hole ash is positively related with the spreading influence Mi with extremely
small p-value (Fig. 3 and Tables S9 and S10). However, this pattern does not hold for
all social networks that we tested. For QXF, QXG, and POK networks, ashi is
negatively correlated with Mi in contrary to the weak tie hypothesis (Fig. 3 and
Tables S6-S8). This result suggests that the weak tie hypothesis may not be generically
valid for all social networks.
The validity of the weak tie hypothesis can rely on the underlying network where
spreading occurs. People with high frequency of structural hole interactions potentially
spreads different communities all together. Therefore, if an underlying network of
spreading has clear module structure, the effect of weak ties is significant [38]. However,
when community structure is less clear the role of weak ties in spreading can be
weakened. In order to check this prediction, we compare the modularity of networks [39]
and the effect of weak ties (Fig. 3). When a network has strong community structure
such as LJ and PRO whose modularity is 0.658 and 0.629, respectively, the frequency of
structural hole is positively correlated with Mi. Therefore, the structural hole
mechanisms can enhance the epidemic influence for networks with strong modular
structure as the weak tie hypothesis. However, the weak tie hypothesis is not valid for
networks with less clear module structure. For instance, the QXF, QXG, and POK
networks showing less modularity around 0.4, ashi play a minor role in spreading and
negatively correlated with Mi (Fig. 3 and Tables S6-S8). If the modular structure is not
significant, the weak ties are not clearly defined, leading to decrease of the effect of
weak ties. Thus, the weak tie hypothesis is expected to be valid for strong module
structure not universally for all social networks. In conclusion, people who connect
different communities can be suspected as an influential people when an underlying
network is composed of strong modular structure,
Discussion
So far, most studies of spreading on complex networks have assumed that a network
structure is known. This means that full information on any people on who is connected
with whom is required, which may not be obtained in real settings. In agreement with
the previous studies, we find that when the information of global structure of social
networks is available, it is beneficial for identifying influential spreaders in an epidemic
model capturing up to 90 % of the variance with simple variables with the k-shell [8, 10].
In reality, however, it is difficult to gather the complete sets of interactions among
people. Therefore, all the previous method for the influential spreaders based on the
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network topology could be impractical. Searching for influential spreaders without the
information of a network is essential in order to prevent the global pandemic and
minimize the cost for immunization.
Thus, we proposed a possible strategy for identifying the influential spreaders by
using characteristics of people’s behavior underlying the evolution of social networks.
Our finding provides several pragmatic lessons for the efficient immunization strategy as
well efficient information spreading campaigns. First, in the absence of k-shell, the
degree is the first local quantity that can be used to predict the influential spreaders.
From the behavioral variables quantifying the social mechanisms aαi , collective action
gives a complementary information to the degree, so it is suitable for a strong indicator
for influential spreaders when comparing among people with the same degree. Also, a
person with a high tendency to connect two different groups via weak ties can also be
suspected as a influential spreader when the network has a strong modular structure.
Our analysis provide not only an applicable identifying scheme of influential spreader
based on surveys but also a guideline for activity to the public, about how to behave
when epidemic occurs. For instance, during the beginning stage of epidemic, one need
to avoid meeting popular people or people belonging to a different group that could
spread diseases to huge population.
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Multilinear regression for the QXF networks with Eq. (1)
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Multilinear regression for the QXG networks with Eq. (1).
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + c5ki + c6k
sh
i + c7k
2sum
i + c8k
sum
i + .
S3 Table
Multilinear regression for the POK networks with Eq. (1).
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Multilinear regression for the LJ networks with Eq. (1).
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Multilinear regression for the PRO networks with Eq. (1).
Mi = c0 + c1a
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i + c2a
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S6 Table
Multilinear regression for the QXF networks with Eqs. (2) and (5).
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
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i + c4a
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Multilinear regression for the QXG networks with Eqs. (2) and (5).
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Multilinear regression for the POK networks with Eqs. (2) and (5).
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Multilinear regression for the LJ networks with Eqs. (2) and (5).
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S10 Table
Multilinear regression for the PRO networks with Eqs. (2) and (5).
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k-shell index.
S2 Text
Identifying structural hole in the link community.
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Supporting information
Identifying structural hole
In order to identify the intercommunity links, called the structural hole, we use the link
community detection method proposed in [1]. We adapt the method for local version
only using local information of networks because global information is difficult to obtain
by surveys. The method for identifying structural hole link is following. When a new
link eik is added, likewise the original link community algorithm [1], we define the
similarity S(eik, ejk) between two links eik and each of existed links ejk by following,
S(eik, ejk) =
|n+(i) ∩ n+(j)|
|n+(i) ∪ n+(j)| , (6)
where n+(i) is the set of neighbors of node i. Therefore, if there are many common
friends the similarity is high. Then, if the similarity is less than a certain threshold
meaning that two neighbors have only few fraction of common friends, we judge the
newly added link as a structural hole.
Epidemic size for a seed node with degree k on randomized
networks
The susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model on a network can be mapped into bond
percolation problem with the probability of link occupation β. In the perspective of
bond percolation, the epidemic size initiated by a single seed node is the statistically
same as the average size of component including the seed node. Then, one can obtain
the epidemic size initiated by a seed node having degree k by following a generating
function method [2, 3]. Given the degree distribution q(k) of a network, we define the
degree generating function as G0(x) =
∑∞
k=0 q(k)x
k. We also define the generating
function for the excess degree, for a node reached by following a randomly chosen link,
as G1(x) =
1
〈k〉
dG0(x)
dx . For the locally-tree like networks, the probability u that a node
reached by following a randomly chosen link does not belong to the giant component is
given by
u =
∞∑
k=1
kq(k)
〈k〉 [1 + (u− 1)β]
k−1 = G1[1 + (u− 1)β]. (7)
The probability pk that a randomly chosen node with degree k belongs to the giant
component can be obtained as
pk = 1− [1 + (u− 1)β]k. (8)
We can also obtain the size s of the giant component of a given network as
s = 1−G0[1 + (u− 1)β]. Finally, the average epidemic size, Sk, initiated by node with
a degree k is a product of pk and s, Sk = spk.
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Table 7. Multilinear regression for the QXF network.
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + c5ki.
intercept k exchange balance coll. act. str. hole R2
0.889∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ −3.79∗∗∗ 0.625
[0.0432] [0.000205] [0.0690] [0.0688] [0.103] [0.211]
0.808∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗∗ - 1.04∗∗∗ 2.94∗∗∗ −3.84∗∗∗ 0.624
[0.0410] [0.000204] [0.0677] [0.102] [0.211]
0.954∗∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗ - 3.20∗∗∗ −4.34∗∗∗ 0.617
[0.0433] [0.000201] [0.0685] [0.102] [0.210]
1.86∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ −0.579∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ - −2.63∗∗∗ 0.602
[0.0269] [0.000211] [0.0708] [0.0696] [0.213]
0.868∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ −0.473∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗ - 0.615
[0.0436] [0.000207] [0.0675] [0.0687] [0.102]
2.40∗∗∗ - −1.39∗∗∗ 3.26∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ −6.12∗∗∗ 0.133
[0.0631] [0.104] [0.102] [0.156] [0.319]
2.15∗∗∗ - - 3.04∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ −6.36∗∗∗ 0.121
[0.0607] [0.101] [0.156] [0.321]
2.74∗∗∗ - −0.843∗∗∗ - 2.95∗∗∗ −8.07∗∗∗ 0.0650
[0.0647] [0.107] [0.159] [0.326]
3.07∗∗∗ - −1.50∗∗∗ 3.50∗∗∗ - −5.28∗∗∗ 0.121
[0.0373] [0.105] [0.101] [0.314]
2.39∗∗∗ - −1.51∗∗∗ 3.63∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ - 0.109
[0.0640] [0.105] [0.101] [0.155]
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Table 8. Multilinear regression for the QXG network.
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + c5ki.
intercept k exchange balance coll. act. str. hole R2
0.63∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 3.24∗∗∗ −2.41∗∗∗ 0.684
[0.0482] [0.000490] [0.0628] [0.0815] [0.127] [0.174]
0.71∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ −2.38∗∗∗ 0.682
[0.0474] [0.000491] [0.0808] [0.122] [0.174]
0.657∗∗∗ 0.0611∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ −3.00∗∗∗ 0.675
[0.0488] [0.000491] [0.0629] [0.125] [0.172]
1.46∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ −0.893∗∗∗ 0.660
[0.0369] [0.000507] [0.0626] [0.0820] [0.170]
0.681∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 0.677
[0.0486] [0.000493] [0.0635] [0.0804] [0.121]
2.10∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗ −4.81∗∗∗ 0.141
[0.0769] [0.103] [0.133] [0.209] [0.285]
2.08∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 4.17∗∗∗ −4.82∗∗∗ 0.141
[0.0756] [0.131] [0.201] [0.285]
2.21∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 5.31∗∗∗ −6.22∗∗∗ 0.100
[0.0785] [0.104] [0.207] [0.283]
3.21∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗ −2.86∗∗∗ 0.101
[0.0552] [0.102] [0.132] [0.275]
2.23∗∗∗ −0.161NS 3.26∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 0.113
[0.0778] [0.105] [0.131] [0.200]
Table 9. Multilinear regression for the POK network.
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + c5ki.
intercept k exchange balance coll. act. str. hole R2
0.669∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗∗ −1.34∗∗∗ 0.264
[0.0414] [0.000362] [0.0571] [0.110] [0.0987] [0.126]
0.859∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ −1.31∗∗∗ 0.257
[0.0385] [0.000364] [0.110] [0.0989] [0.126]
0.738∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ −1.57∗∗∗ 0.245
[0.0418] [0.000365] [0.0575] [0.0995] [0.127]
1.67∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.219
[0.0278] [0.000373] [0.0587] [0.113] [0.121]
0.713∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗∗ 0.259
[0.0413] [0.000363] [0.0573] [0.110] [0.0920]
0.921∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗ −1.67∗∗∗ 0.0977
[0.0456] [0.0632] [0.122] [0.109] [0.139]
1.13∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 3.21∗∗∗ −1.63∗∗∗ 0.0898
[0.0423] [0.121] [0.109] [0.140]
1.02∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗ −1.96∗∗∗ 0.0680
[0.0461] [0.0639] [0.111] [0.141]
1.91∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗∗ −0.19NS 0.0532
[0.0303] [0.0646] [0.124] [0.133]
0.978∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 0.0899
[0.0455] [0.0635] [0.122] [0.102]
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Table 10. Multilinear regression for the LJ network.
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + c5ki.
intercept k exchange balance coll. act. str. hole R2
1.24∗∗∗ 0.00305∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗ 4.47∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 0.195
[0.0207] [5.76e-5] [0.111] [0.0513] [0.0545] [0.0549]
1.26∗∗∗ 0.00305∗∗∗ 4.56∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.194
[0.0206] [5.76e-5] [0.0507] [0.0545] [0.0549]
1.18∗∗∗ 0.00366∗∗∗ 2.88∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.103
[0.0219] [6.04e-5] [0.116] [0.0537] [0.0571]
1.48∗∗∗ 0.00301∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 0.193
[0.0129] [5.76e-5] [0.111] [0.0479] [0.0512]
1.23∗∗∗ 0.00304∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.186
[0.0208] [5.79e-5] [0.112] [0.0508] [0.0510]
1.32∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 4.80∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 0.160
[0.0211] [0.113] [0.0520] [0.0556] [0.0560]
1.35∗∗∗ 4.89∗∗∗ 0.6534∗ ∗ ∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 0.159
[0.0210] [0.0514] [0.0556] [0.0561]
1.27∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.0505
[0.0224] [0.119] [0.0551] [0.0587]
1.52∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗ 5.02∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 0.158
[0.0132] [0.113] [0.0486] [0.0523]
1.31∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗ 4.56∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.152
[0.0212] [0.114] [0.0515] [0.0520]
Table 11. Multilinear regression for the PRO network.
Mi = c0 + c1a
exc
i + c2a
bal
i + c3a
ca
i + c4a
sh
i + c5ki.
intercept k coll. act. str. hole R2
−0.405∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 3.67∗∗∗ 0.625
[0.0382] [0.00128] [0.0810] [0.134]
−0.412∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 0.594
[0.0398] [0.00133] [0.0800]
1.07∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 5.65∗∗∗ 0.533
[0.0246] [0.00142] [0.142]
0.891∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗ 4.50∗∗∗ 0.154
[0.0545] [0.121] [0.201]
2.05∗∗∗ 6.07∗∗∗ 0.093
[0.0309] [0.198]
0.906∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 0.108
[0.0559] [0.118]
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